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Abstract
In this paper we consider one-machine sequencing situations with interval data.
We present diﬀerent possible scenarioes and extend classical results on well known
rules and on sequencing games to the interval setting.
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1 Introduction
Sequencing situations arise in several instances of real life. Here, we refer to the classical
scheduling of a sequence of jobs and the waiting line in front of a counter. The use of an
optimal ordering may reduce the cost connected with the time spent in the system and
is particularly interesting in sequencing situations where several agents are involved. In
such situations, the optimal order is good for the agents as a whole (because it increases
the eﬃciency of the system), but since agents are basically interesting in their individual
beneﬁt, an agreement is equally important. The agreement includes how to compensate
those agents that are required to spend more time in the system and how to share the
joint cost savings. In the classical approach to the problem, the processing time of each
job and the cost per unit of time associated with it are supposed to be known with
certainty. It should be clear that the optimality of an ordering may be aﬀected when the
actual processing times and/or unitary costs are diﬀerent from the forecasted ones. In this
paper we simply require an estimation of intervals of values for the processing times and/or
unitary costs, avoiding the diﬃculties of associating a reasonable probability distribution.
1In this setting the optimal order may be diﬃcult to reach, but the agents may accept to
switch their position in the queue in change of an adequate compensation.
Depending on the agents’ attitude towards risk, various possibilities could be consid-
ered to settle the agreement, both for improving the ordering (with more switches) and
for sharing the joint cost savings.
To handle sequencing situations with interval data, the theory of cooperative interval
games is helpful. In this paper, we use some notions and results (Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel
and Tijs 2008; Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs 2008a, b). The reader is referred to
Branzei, Tijs and Alparslan G¨ ok (2008a, b) for a brief survey on cooperative interval
games and interval solution concepts, and for a guide for using interval solution when
uncertainty on data is removed.
The paper is organized as follows. We recall in Section 2 basic notions and results from
interval calculus, theory of cooperative interval games, one-machine sequencing situations
and classical sequencing games. Section 3 is devoted to one-machine sequencing situation
with interval uncertainty. In Section 4 we introduce the class of cooperative sequencing
interval games and show that they are convex interval games. Furthermore, we extend
the classical equal gain splitting rule to the interval setting, give an explicit formula to
compute the interval equal gain splitting allocation for a sequencing situation with interval
data, and prove that this allocation belongs to the interval core of the related sequencing
interval game. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries and notations
2.1 Interval games
In this section some preliminaries from interval calculus and some useful results from the
theory of cooperative interval games are given (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs 2008a,
b).
We denote by I(R) the set of all closed intervals in R, by I(R+) the set of all closed
intervals in R+, and by I(R+)N the set of all n-dimensional vectors with components in
I(R+).




, |a| = a − a and β ∈ R+. Then, a + b =
£
a + b,a + b
¤
; βa = [βa,βa]. The subtraction operator a − b is deﬁned, only if |a| ≥ |b|,
by a − b =
£
a − b,a − b
¤
. Let a,b ∈ I(R+). Then, a   b = [a b,a b]. The division operator
a




b]. We say that a is weakly better
than b, which we denote by a < b, if and only if a ≥ b and a ≥ b. We also use the reverse
notation b 4 a, if and only if b ≤ a and b ≤ a.
A cooperative interval game in coalitional form (Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel and Tijs 2008)
is an ordered pair < N,w > where N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players, and w : 2N →
I(R) is the characteristic function such that w(∅) = [0,0]. For each S ∈ 2N, the worth
w(S) of the coalition S in the interval game < N,w > is of the form [w(S),w(S)], where
w(S) is the lower bound and w(S) is the upper bound of w(S). We denote by IGN
the family of all cooperative interval games with player set N. Some classical cooperative
games associated with an interval game w ∈ IGN play a key role, namely the border games
< N,w >, < N,w > and the length game < N,|w| >, where |w|(S) = w(S) − w(S) for
each S ∈ 2N. Note that w = w + |w|.
For w1,w2 ∈ IGN with |w1(S)| ≥ |w2(S)| for each S ∈ 2N, < N,w1 − w2 > is deﬁned
by (w1 − w2)(S) = w1(S) − w2(S).














We call a game < N,w > convex if w(S)+w(T) 4 w(S∪T)+w(S∩T) for all S,T ∈ 2N
and < N,|w| > is convex (in the classical sense, i.e. |w|(S) + |w|(T) ≤ |w|(S ∪ T) +
|w|(S ∩ T)).
We denote by CIGN the class of convex interval games with player set N.
A game < N,w > is size monotonic if < N,|w| > is monotonic, i.e. |w|(S) ≤ |w|(T)
for all S,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T. We denote by SMIGN the class of size monotonic interval
games with player set N.
Let σ : N → N be a permutation of the set N. The interval marginal vector of
w ∈ SMIGN with respect to σ, mσ(w), is the vector whose component i is deﬁned by
mσ
i (w) = w(Pσ(i)∪{i})−w(Pσ(i)) for each i ∈ N, where Pσ(i) = {r ∈ N|σ−1(r) < σ−1(i)}
is the set of predecessors of i in σ.
32.2 Sequencing situations and related games
A one-machine sequencing situation arises when a set of ordered jobs has to be processed
sequentially on a machine. The basic issue is to determine the optimal order of the jobs
to be processed taking into account the individual processing times and the costs per unit
of time. Formally, a sequencing situation is a 4-tuple (N,σ0,α,p) where:
• N = {1,...,n} is the set of jobs;
• σ0 : N → {1,...,n} is a permutation that deﬁnes the initial order of the jobs;
• α = (αi)i∈N ∈ Rn
+ is a non-negative real vector, where αi is the cost per unit of time
of job i;
• p = (pi)i∈N ∈ Rn
+ is a positive real vector, where pi is the processing time of job i.
Given a sequencing situation and an ordering σ of the jobs, we can associate to it the cost
Cσ deﬁned by the sum of the costs of the jobs, where the cost of job i ∈ N is given by the
product of its unitary cost αi and the time that it spends in the system, i.e. its processing





j∈P(σ,i) pj + pi
´
, where P(σ,i) is the set of jobs preceding i,
according to the order σ.




j∈P(σ∗,i) pj + pi
´
or the maximum cost saving Cσ0−Cσ∗. Smith (1956) proved
that an optimal order can be obtained reordering the jobs according to decreasing urgency
indices, where the urgency index of job i ∈ N is deﬁned as ui =
αi
pi
(clearly, if this con-
dition holds for the initial order no reordering of jobs is necessary).
If the jobs belong to the same agent he will agree to reorder them optimally, according
to Smith’s result. The situation is completely diﬀerent when each job belongs to a diﬀerent
agent. In this case, a reordering requires that at least the agents that change their position
agree on the new order. So, we can say that a switch among two jobs is always possible
if they are consecutive in the current order or if all the agents that own one of the jobs
in between the two that are switched agree.
The following question arises: Is it possible to share this cost savings Cσ0 −Cσ∗ among
the agents in such a way that the new order results to be stable? In other words we want
4to ﬁnd fair shares of the overall cost savings to be given to the diﬀerent agents, in such a
way that all of them agree on the optimal order and have no incentive to recede from the
agreement. This question ﬁnds its natural habitat in cooperative game theory.
In 1989 Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs introduced the class of sequencing games. An
updated survey on these games can be found in Curiel, Hamers and Klijn (2002). See
also the survey on Operation Research Games (Borm, Hamers and Hendricks 2001). A
sequencing game is a pair < N,v > where N is the set of players, that coincides with the
set of jobs, and the characteristic function v assigns to coalition S the maximal cost savings
that the members of S can obtain by reordering only their jobs. We say that a set of jobs
T is connected according to an order σ if for all i,j ∈ T and k ∈ N,σ(i) < σ(k) < σ(j)
implies k ∈ T.
Switching two connected jobs i,j the cost associated to the ordering varies of αjpi −
αipj. The variation is positive if and only if the urgency indices verify ui < uj. Clearly, if
αjpi −αipj is negative it is not beneﬁcial for i and j to switch their positions. We denote
the gain of the switch as
gij = (αjpi − αipj)+ = max{0,αjpi − αipj}







If S is not a connected coalition, the order σ induces a partition in connected compo-
nents, denoted by S/σ. In view of this, the characteristic function v of the sequencing game
can be deﬁned as v(S) =
P
T∈S/σ




where u[i,j] is the unanimity game deﬁned as:
u[i,j](S) =
(
1 if {i,i + 1,...,j − 1,j} ⊂ S
0 otherwise
.
Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989) show that sequencing games are convex games and,
consequently, their core is nonempty. Moreover, it is possible to determine a core alloca-
tion without computing the characteristic function of the game. They propose to share
equally between the players i,j the gain gij produced by the switch and call this rule







j:i∈P(σ,j) gij for each i ∈ N. There exist two other simple allocation rules, denoted
respectively by P and S. According to the ﬁrst rule the gain of each switch is assigned to
the predecessor in the initial order, while the second rule assigns the gain to the successor.
We can write Pi =
P
j:i∈P(σ,j) gij and Si =
P
j∈P(σ,i) gji for each i ∈ N and it is easy to
see that EGS = 1
2(P + S).
In a similar way, we can deﬁne the EGSε solution for each ε ∈ [0,1] as EGSε =
εP + (1 − ε)S. Clearly, for ε = 0 we get S, for ε = 1
2 we get EGS, and for ε = 1 we get
P.
3 Sequencing interval situations
In this section we drop the hypothesis of complete knowledge of the parameters of a
sequencing situation, in order to better ﬁt the real-world situations. In particular, we
suppose that the processing time and/or the cost per unit of time of each job are repre-
sented by intervals. In fact each agent may have some diﬃculties in evaluating the actual
duration of his/her job and the unitary cost. On the other hand, it is often possible to
assign minimal and maximal values for both elements. We consider three scenarioes: in
the ﬁrst one the processing time of each job is a positive real number but its unitary cost
is an interval of positive real values; in the second one the unitary costs are positive real
numbers and the processing times are intervals of positive real values; in the last one both
elements are intervals of positive real values.
3.1 The ﬁrst scenario
A one-machine sequencing situation with interval-uncertain costs per unit of time can be
described as a 4-tuple (N,σ0,α,p), where N,σ0 and p are the same as in the classical case
and α = ([αi,αi])i∈N ∈ I(R+)N is the vector of intervals where αi is the minimal unitary
cost and αi is the maximal unitary cost of job i.
In this situation, the arithmetic of intervals allows us to compute the urgency index










To use Smith’s result for ﬁnding the optimal order we need not only to compare ui
and uj to check if ui 4 uj for any two possible candidates i and j to a neighbor switch,
6but also that these intervals are disjoint, i.e. ui ≤ uj. This setting corresponds to the
maximal risk aversion of the agents that agree on a switch of their job only if it is surely
proﬁtable.
Example 3.1. Consider the sequencing interval situation with N = {1,2}, σ0 = {1,2},
p = (2,3) and α = ([2,4],[12,21]). The urgency indices are u1 = [1,2] and u2 = [4,7], so
the two jobs may be switched.
Now, the question is how to share among the switching agents i and j the gain arising
from their switch. We consider two possible approaches.
First, the agents i and j may agree on the dictatorial solution for agent i, i.e. the
compensation corresponds to the upper bound αipj; this means that agent i asks to be
fully compensated referring to his maximal unitary cost, plus the possibility of an extra
gain if the actual cost per unit of time is lower.
Second, the agents i and j could determine the individual compensation when the jobs
are performed and realizations of the unitary costs are available. This leads to a classical
sequencing situation and the agents may agree on one of the existing allocation rules, e.g.
the EGS-rule.
Example 3.2. Referring to the situation in Example 3.1 the dictatorial approach assigns
to agent 1 a compensation α2p1 = 21×2 = 42 and 0 to agent 2. The realization approach
may be performed only when the two jobs are processed. Suppose that the realization of the
unitary cost is 4 for agent 1 and 16 for agent 2. The EGS-rule for the resulting classical
sequencing situation assigns to both agents a compensation of 4.
3.2 The second scenario
We describe a one-machine sequencing situation with interval-uncertain processing time as
a 4-tuple (N,σ0,α,p), where N,σ0 and α are as in the classical case and p = ([p
i,pi])i∈N ∈
I(R+)N is the vector of intervals where p
i is the minimal processing time and pi is the
maximal processing time of job i.
In this situation, the arithmetic of intervals does not allow us to compute the urgency
index of a job, as we cannot divide a real number by an interval, so we introduce the










for all i ∈ N.
7We notice that the relaxation index is the inverse of the urgency index in the classical
case, so we may reformulate for this scenario the rule of Smith saying that to obtain an
optimal order the jobs have to be ordered according to increasing relaxation indices. Two
jobs i,j ∈ N may be switched only if ri < rj and the intervals are disjoint, i.e. ri ≥ rj.
We can consider the same sharing approaches of the ﬁrst scenario, with suitable mod-
iﬁcation.
3.3 The third scenario
Here a one-machine sequencing interval situation is described as a 4-tuple (N,σ0,α,p),
where N and σ0 are as usual, whereas α = ([αi,αi])i∈N ∈ I(R+)N and p = ([p
i,pi])i∈N ∈
I(R+)N are the vectors of intervals with αi, αi representing the minimal and maximal uni-
tary cost of job i, respectively, and p
i, pi representing the minimal and maximal processing
time of job i, respectively.
To handle such sequencing situations we propose to use either the approach based on
urgency indices or the approach based on relaxation indices. This requires to be able to

















for all i ∈ N, i.e. for each such
index the lower bound has to be less than or equal to the upper bound. Example 3.5
shows that this could be impossible. When all indices of a certain type can be calculated,
they are useful to ﬁnd an optimal order only in case they can be ordered properly and
are also disjoint. Example 3.3 illustrates a successful use of the urgency indices, while
Example 3.4 shows that although the relaxation indices can be computed and compared
they are not useful to ﬁnd an optimal order because they are not disjoint.
Example 3.3. Consider the two-agent situation with p1 = [1,4],p2 = [6,8],α1 = [5,25],α2 =











and use them to reorder the jobs as
the intervals are disjoint.
Example 3.4. Consider the two-agent situation with p1 = [1,3],p2 = [4,6],α1 = [5,6],α2 =












, but we cannot reorder the jobs as
the intervals are not disjoint.
8Example 3.5. Consider the two-agent situation with p1 = [1,3],p2 = [5,8],α1 = [5,6],α2 =
[10,30]. Now, r1 is deﬁned but r2 is undeﬁned; on the other hand u1 is undeﬁned and u2 is
deﬁned, so no comparison is possible and, consequently, the reordering cannot take place.
If two jobs may be switched, we can use the sharing approaches introduced above. In
particular, we may have not a total order, as some pairs of jobs cannot be compared, but
we may reach just a partial optimal order and share the associated gains.
Remark 3.1. Allowing degenerate intervals [a,a] ∈ I(R+) leads to the possibility of unique
game-theoretic treatment of all three scenarios of sequencing situations with interval data,
based on the third scenario. In fact in the ﬁrst scenario we may consider the vector of real
numbers p = (pi)i∈N as a vector of degenerate intervals p = ([pi,pi])i∈N. Analogously, in
the second scenario we may consider the vector of real numbers α = (αi)i∈N as a vector
of degenerate intervals α = ([αi,αi])i∈N.
4 Cooperative interval games
In this section we introduce the class of cooperative sequencing interval games. In view
of Remark 3.1 we refer to the general situation presented in the third scenario.
Let i,j ∈ N. We deﬁne the interval gain of the switch of jobs i and j by Let the
interval gain of a switch be:
Gij =
(
αjpi − αipj if jobs i and j switch
[0,0] otherwise
.






provided that Gij ∈ I(R) for all switching jobs i,j ∈ N.
Remark 4.1. The condition GijI(R) is equivalent to Gij ≤ Gij. Note that for the ﬁrst













9and such conditions may be not satisﬁed. Consider the sequencing interval situation with
N = {1,2}, σ0 = {1,2}, p = ([2,2],[3,3]) and α = ([2,4],[12,13]). The urgency indices





, so the switch is proﬁtable, as u2 is larger than u1 = [1,2];









, implying that G12 = [18,14]
that is not an interval.
In the following we show that each sequencing interval game is convex.
Proposition 4.1. Let < N,w > be a sequencing interval game. Then, < N,w > is
convex.
Proof. By deﬁnition Gij < [0,0]. So, Gij ≥ 0 and |Gij| ≥ 0 for all (i,j). It is well
know that classical unanimity games are convex. Then, w =
P
i,j∈N:i<j
Giju[i,j] and |w| =
P
i,j∈N:i<j




convex (see Proposition 3.2 (iii) Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs 2008b).









for each i ∈ N.
Proposition 4.2. Let < N,w > be a sequencing interval game. Then,
i) IEGS(w) = 1
2(m(1,2...,n)(w) + m(n,n−1,...,1)(w)).
ii) IEGS(w) ∈ C(w).
Proof.
i) If σ = (1,2,...,n), then
m
(1,2...,n)(w) = ([0,0],G12,G13 + G23,G14 + G24 + G34,...,G1n + ... + Gn−1,n).
If σ = (n,n − 1,...,1), then
m
(n,n−1,...,1)(w) = (G12 + ... + G1,n,...,Gn−1,n,[0,0]).
ii) It is proved (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs 2008b) that the interval marginal
vectors are interval core elements for convex interval games. The proof follows
10immediately as the sequencing interval games are convex by Proposition 4.1 and
the interval core is a convex set (see Proposition 3.3 Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and
Tijs 2008a).
Example 4.1. Referring to the situation in Example 3.1, the interval gain is G12 =
[18,30], the sequencing interval game < N,w > is w(1) = w(2) = [0,0], w(1,2) = [18,30]
and IEGS(w) = ([9,15],[9,15]).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we introduced and studied sequencing situations with interval data and
introduced the related class of interval games. Our approach to ﬁnd an optimal order was
to try to use either urgency indices ui for all i ∈ N or relaxation indices ri for all i ∈ N.
However, as we already saw, for some sequencing interval situations we may have
diﬃculties in ordering the jobs using only the urgency indices or the relaxation indices.
In such situations, we can (partially) reorder the jobs using a mixed approach: We can
consider actually adjacent pairs of jobs i and j for which both ui and uj or both ri and
rj are deﬁned and decide if they may be switched, i.e. if all the required conditions are
satisﬁed. Consider the sequencing interval situation with N = {1,2,3,4}, σ0 = {1,2,3,4},
p = ([1,6],[8,15],[2,3],[2,7]) and α = ([1,3],[2,3],[6,12],[6,8]). We may compute u1 =






, while the other indices are undeﬁned. We
can observe that jobs 1 and 2 and jobs 3 and 4 may be switched, but we can say nothing
about jobs 1 and 4, that become adjacent after the ﬁrst two switches, as we have no
common index. But we can go further in our analysis. In fact it is easy to realize that
the urgency of job 1 is a number in the interval [1,2] while the relaxation of job 4 is a






so, in any realization the urgency of job 4 is a number in
the interval [2,3] and apparently the switch is surely proﬁtable. The approach using both
urgency indices and relaxation indices when dealing with sequencing interval situation is
a topic for further research.
Other approaches for sharing the gain generated by a switch may be investigated. For
example, it is possible to assign to each job its minimal compensation obtained supposing
11that its unitary cost and the processing time of the jobs involved in the switches coincide
with the lower bound; after a realization, the diﬀerence between the actual cost savings
and the sum of shares already distributed over the switched jobs, can be allocated ac-
cording to a fair division procedure or a bankruptcy rule.
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